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Introduction
Comparative advantage, whether driven by technology or factor endowment, is at the core of neoclassical trade theory. Using tools from the mathematics of complementarity, this paper o¤ers a simple, yet unifying perspective on the fundamental forces that shape comparative advantage in economies with an arbitrarily large number of countries, goods, and factors.
Section 2 o¤ers a review of some basic de…nitions and results in the mathematics of complementarity. Our analysis emphasizes one key property: log-supermodularity. Broadly speaking, the log-supermodularity of a multivariate function captures the idea that increasing one variable is relatively more important when the other variables are high. To …x ideas, consider the following statement. Countries with better …nancial systems produce relatively more in sectors with higher …nancial requirements. The formal counterpart to this statement is that aggregate output is log-supermodular in the quality of countries'…nancial systems and the level of sectors'…nancial requirements. In a trade context, log-supermodularity provides a powerful way to conceptualize the relationship between technology, factor endowment, and international specialization, as we will soon demonstrate.
Section 3 describes our theoretical framework. We develop a multi-factor generalization of the Ricardian model with an arbitrary number of countries and sectors to which we refer as an "elementary neoclassical economy." Factors of production are immobile across countries and perfectly mobile across sectors. Each country, sector, and factor is associated with a distinct characteristic denoted , , and !, respectively. For instance, may capture the quality of a country's educational system, the skill intensity of a sector, and ! the number of years of education of a worker. The two primitives of our model are: (i) factor productivity, q (!; ; ), which may vary across countries and sectors; and (ii) factor supply, f (!; ), which may vary across countries. They re ‡ect the two sources of comparative advantage in a neoclassical environment, technology and factor endowment.
In this paper, we derive three sets of results on the pattern of international specialization.
Section 4 focuses on the case in which only technological di¤erences are a source of comparative advantage. Formally, we assume that q (!; ; ) h (!) a ( ; ). Under this restriction, our general model reduces to a standard Ricardian model. In this environment, we show that if a ( ; ) is log-supermodular, then aggregate output Q( ; ) is log-supermodular as well.
Economically speaking, if high-countries are relatively more productive in high-sectors, then they should produce relatively more in these sectors. This …rst result has played an important, albeit implicit role in many applications and extensions of the Ricardian model.
It is at the heart, for example, of the recent literature on institutions and trade; see e.g. Acemoglu, Antras, and Helpman (2007) , Costinot (2006) , Cuñat and Melitz (2006) , Levchenko (2007) , Matsuyama (2005) , Nunn (2007) , and Vogel (2007) . At a formal level, these papers all share the same fundamental objective: providing micro-theoretical foundations for the log-supermodularity of factor productivity with respect to countries'"institutional quality" and sectors'"institutional dependence,"whatever those characteristics may be.
Section 5 analyzes the polar case in which factor productivity varies across countries in a Hicks-neutral way, q(!; ; ) a ( ) h (!; ). Hence, only factor endowment di¤erences are a source of comparative advantage. This particular version of our model is a simple generalization of Ru¢ n (1988) . In this environment, we show that if f (!; ) and h (!; ) are log-supermodular, then aggregate output Q( ; ) also is log-supermodular. The basic logic is intuitive. On the one hand, high-countries have relatively more high-! factors. On the other hand, high-! factors are more likely to be employed in high-sectors because they are relatively more productive in these sectors. This explains why high-countries should produce relatively more in high-sectors. Like in the Ricardian case, log-supermodularity provides the mathematical apparatus to make these "relatively more"statements precise.
As we later discuss, this second set of results can be used to establish the robustness of many qualitative insights from the literature on "heterogeneity and trade." Whether they focus on worker heterogeneity or …rm heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003) , previous insights typically rely on strong functional forms which guarantee explicit closed form solutions. For example, Ohnsorge and Tre ‡er (2004) assume that distributions of worker skills are lognormal, while Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Antras and Helpman (2004) assume that distributions of …rm productivity are Pareto. Our results formally show that assuming the log-supermodularity of f (!; ) is critical for many of their results, whereas assuming log-normal and Pareto distributions is not.
Section 6 considers elementary neoclassical economies in which both factor endowment and technological di¤erences are sources of comparative advantage. In these economies, we show that unless strong functional form restrictions are imposed, robust predictions about international specialization can only be derived in the two most extreme sectors. In general, the log-supermodularity of f (!; ) and q(!; ; ) is not su¢ cient to derive the logsupermodularity of aggregate output. In the presence of complementarities between factor and sector characteristics, which are necessary for factor endowments to a¤ect comparative advantage, the indirect impact of Ricardian technological di¤erences on the assignment of factors to sectors may dominate its direct impact on factor productivity. This is an important observation which highlights the potential caveats of combining insights from distinct models without a generalizing framework.
Although we are, to the best of our knowledge, the …rst ones to emphasize the role of logsupermodularity in a trade context, this property has been used previously in many areas of economics, including auction theory, Milgrom and Weber (1982) ; monotone comparative statics under uncertainty, Jewitt (1987) and Athey (2002) ; and matching, Shimer and Smith (2000) . From a mathematical standpoint, Jewitt (1987) and Athey (2002) are most closely related to our paper. In particular, the fact that log-supermodularity is preserved by multiplication and integration is, like in Jewitt (1987) and Athey (2002) , at the core of our analysis. 1 In this respect, our contribution is to show that this mathematical property also has natural and useful applications for international trade.
The theory of comparative advantage presented in this paper is attractive for two reasons. The …rst one is that it allows us to consider both sources of comparative advantage, technology and factor endowment, within a unifying, yet highly tractable framework. This is important not only for generalizing results from the previous literature, but also because factor endowment in practice coexist with technology and institutional di¤erences. Indeed, they often have the same causes; see e.g. Acemoglu (1998) . The second reason is dimensionality. For pedagogical purposes, neoclassical trade theory is usually taught using simple models with a small number of countries, goods, and factors. The two most celebrated examples are the Ricardian model-with one factor, two goods, and two countries-and the Heckscher-Ohlin model-with two factors, two goods, and two countries. 2 In these simple models, di¤erences in either technology or factor endowments have strong implications for the pattern of international specialization. Unfortunately, strong results do not generally survive in environments with higher dimensionality; see e.g. Ethier (1984) and Deardor¤ (2007) . By contrast, our predictions hold for an arbitrarily large number of countries, goods, and factors. In this respect, our paper is closely related to Deardor¤ (1980) . Compared to Deardor¤'s (1980) law of comparative advantage, our main results are less general in that we restrict ourselves to a multi-factor generalization of the Ricardian model under free trade, but they are stronger in that they apply to any pair of goods and derive from restrictions on the model's primitives, factor productivity and factor supply, rather than autarky prices.
Finally, we believe that our general approach could also be useful outside international trade. The basic structure of our model is central to many models with agent heterogeneity.
At the core of these models, there are "populations"of "agents"sorting across "occupations."
As we argue in our concluding remarks, whatever these categories may refer to in practice, they often are the formal counterparts to "countries,""factors,"and "sectors"in our theory.
Log-Supermodularity
Our analysis emphasizes one particular form of complementarity: log-supermodularity. 3
Since this concept is not widely used in the trade literature, we begin with a review of some basic de…nitions and results. Topkis (1998) and Athey (2002) o¤er an excellent overview and additional references.
2.1. De…nition. Let X = Q n i=1 X i where each X i is totally ordered. For any x; x 0 2 X, we say that x x 0 if x i x 0 i for all i = 1; :::; n. We let max (x; x 0 ) be the vector of X whose ith component is max (x i ;x 0 i ), and min (x; x 0 ) be the vector whose ith component is min (x i ;x 0 i ). Finally, we denote x i the vector x with the ith component removed. With the previous notations, log-supermodularity can be de…ned as follows.
If g is strictly positive, then g is log-supermodular if and only if ln g is supermodular.
This means that if g also is twice di¤erentiable, then g is log-supermodular in (x i ; x j ) if and only if @ 2 ln g @x i @x j 0. To get more intuition about the form of complementarities that log-supermodularity captures, consider g : X 1 X 2 ! R + . For every x 0 1 x 00 1 , x 0 2 x 00 2 , the log-supermodularity of g in (x 1 ; x 2 ) implies that
If g is strictly positive, this can be rearranged as
Thus, the relative returns to increasing the …rst variable, x 1 , are increasing in the second variable, x 2 . This is equivalent to the monotone likelihood ratio property; see Milgrom (1981) . In a trade context, this property may capture the fact that high-x 1 countries are relatively more productive in high-x 2 sectors, as in the Ricardian model, or that high-x 1 countries are relatively more abundant in high-x 2 factors, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
2.2.
Results. Most of our analysis builds on the two following results:
Lemma 1. If g; h : X ! R + are log-supermodular, then gh is log-supermodular.
Lemma 2. Let i be a -…nite measure on X i . If g : X ! R + is log-supermodular and integrable, then G (
In other words, log-supermodularity is preserved by multiplication and integration. Lemma 1 directly derives from De…nition 1. Proofs of Lemma 2 can be found in Lehmann (1955) for the bivariate case, and Ahlswede and Daykin (1978) and Karlin and Rinott (1980) for the multivariate case. In the rest of this paper, we assume that, whenever integrals appear, requirements of integrability and measurability are met.
Theoretical Framework
We consider a world economy comprising c = 1; :::; C countries with characteristics c 2 , s = 1; :::; S goods or sectors with characteristics s 2 , and multiple factors of production indexed by their characteristics ! 2 , where , , and are totally ordered sets. 4 We let be a -…nite measure on . The number of factors in may be continuous or discrete. 4 We could allow for the existence of countries and sectors whose characteristics cannot be ordered. In this case, our results would simply apply to the subset of countries and sectors with ordered characteristics.
By contrast, our analysis crucially relies on the fact that is totally ordered.
Factors of production are immobile across countries and perfectly mobile across sectors.
f (!; c ) 0 denotes the inelastic supply of factor ! in country c. Factors of production are perfect substitutes within each country and sector, but vary in their productivity q(!; s ; c ) 0. In country c and sector s, aggregate output is given by
where l(!; s ; c ) is the quantity of factor ! allocated to sector s in country c.
At this point, we wish to be clear that our theoretical framework is more general than a Ricardian model in that it allows multiple factors of production, but less general than a standard neoclassical model in that it rules out imperfect substitutability between these factors within each sector. We come back brie ‡y to the relationship between our model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model in Section 5.
Throughout this paper, we focus on the supply-side of this economy under free trade. Our goal is to determine how the cross-sectional variation of our two primitives, q(!; s ; c ) and f (!; c ), a¤ects the cross-sectional variation of aggregate output, Q( s ; c ), taking world prices p ( s ) > 0 as given. To this end, we follow the dual approach of Dixit and Norman (1980) . 
According to De…nition 2, l( ; ; ) is an e¢ cient allocation if it is feasible and it maximizes the value of national output at given prices in all countries. Since there are constant returns to scale, a competitive equilibrium with a large number of pro…t-maximizing …rms would lead to an e¢ cient allocation.
Because of the linearity of aggregate output, e¢ cient allocations are easy to characterize.
Unlike in more general neoclassical models, the marginal return r(!; s ; c ) of factor ! in sector s and country c is independent of the allocation of factors in that sector: r(!; s ; c ) = p ( s ) q(!; s ; c ). 5 As a result, we can solve problem (2) factor-by-factor the same way we would solve the revenue maximization problem in a simple Ricardian model. In any country c, almost all factors ! should be employed in the sector(s) where p ( s ) q(!; s ; c ) is maximum.
In the rest of this paper, we restrict ourselves to environments where problem (2) admits a unique solution.
Assumption 0. The solution to the revenue maximization problem (2) is unique for all c = 1; :::; C and -almost all ! 2 .
By our previous discussion, Assumption 0 requires p ( s ) q(!; s ; c ) to be maximized in a single sector for almost all factors and all countries. Since Assumption 0 plays a crucial role in our analysis, it is important to understand why and in which circumstances it is more likely to be satis…ed.
At a formal level, Assumption 0 is an implicit restriction on the demand side of the world economy, which requires world consumption to be at a vertex of the world production possibility frontier. This is illustrated in Figure 1 in the case of an economy with one factor, two goods, and two countries; or equivalently, two factors, two goods, and one country.
Ceteris paribus, the more vertices there are on the world production possibility frontier, the milder that restriction on preferences becomes. From an economic standpoint, this means that Assumption 0 is more likely to be satis…ed in economies with:
(1) A large number of countries, as in the Ricardian models developed by Becker (1952) , Matsuyama (1996) , and Yanagawa (1996) ;
(2) A large number of factors, as in the trade models with worker heterogeneity developed by Grossman and Maggi (2000), Grossman (2004), and Ohnsorge and Tre ‡er (2004) .
In particular, if there is a continuum of distinct factors in the economy, then Assumption 0 is generically true. Although prices are endogenous objects which may adjust to equalize 5 This would no longer be true, for example, if aggregate production functions were Cobb-Douglas, Throughout this paper, we maintain Assumption 0, which allows us to express aggregate output under an e¢ cient allocation as follows.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 0 holds. Then, for all c = 1; :::; C and s = 1; :::; S, aggregate output under an e¢ cient allocation is given by
where ( s ; c ) is the set of factors allocated to sector s in country c:
From now on, we refer to a world economy where Equations (3) and (4) hold as an elementary neoclassical economy. The rest of our paper o¤ers su¢ cient conditions to make predictions on the pattern of international specialization in this environment. 6 Finally, note that Assumption 0 also is trivially satis…ed in Ricardian models with Armington preferences; see e.g. Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) . In those models, since q(!; s ; c ) is strictly positive in a single sector,
is maximized in a single sector as well.
Source of Comparative Advantage (I): Technology
4.1. De…nition. We …rst consider economies in which factor productivity satis…es
with h (!) > 0 and a ( ; ) 0. Equation (5) allows only Ricardian technological di¤erences across countries. Since a is a function of and , some countries may be relatively more productive in some sectors than others. By contrast, factors may not be relatively more productive in some sectors than others: if factor ! 0 is twice as productive as factor ! in a given sector, then it is twice as productive in all of them.
De…nition 3. An elementary neoclassical economy is a R-economy if Equation (5) holds.
In a R-economy, there are no "real"di¤erences across factors of production. If there exists
for all ! 0 2 . Hence, a R-economy is isomorphic to a standard Ricardian model. In this environment, Assumption 0 directly implies ( s ; c ) = or ;.
Since there are no real di¤erences across factors of production in a R-economy, their marginal returns are maximized in the same sector. As a result, countries only produce one good. 7
Given this restriction, our analysis of the Ricardian model is similar in terms of scope to the analysis of Jones (1961) . 8 4.2. Assumption. To make predictions on the pattern of international specialization in a R-economy, we assume that:
Assumption 1 states that high-countries are relatively more productive in high-sectors.
For any pair of countries, c 1 and c 2 , and goods, s 1 and s 2 , such that c 1 c 2 , s 1 s 2 , 7 Of course, this stark implication of Assumption 0 will no longer be true in elementary neoclassical economies with more than one factor of production. 8 Section 4.4 brie ‡y discusses how our results generalize to Ricardian environments where countries produce more than one good. a( s 1 ; c 2 ) 6 = 0, and a( s 2 ; c 2 ) 6 = 0, Assumption 1 implies
This is the standard inequality at the heart of the Ricardian model. The log-supermodularity of a simply requires that it holds for any ordered pairs of country and sector characteristics.
4.3.
Predictions. The main result of this section can be stated as follows.
Theorem 1. In a R-economy, Assumption 1 implies Q ( ; ) log-supermodular.
The formal proof as well as all subsequent proofs can be found in Appendix A. The argument is simple. If Q ( ; ) were not log-supermodular, then one could …nd a pair of countries and sectors such that the marginal returns of factors of production in the lowsector would be: (i) strictly higher in the high-country; and (ii) strictly lower in the lowcountry. Under free trade, this is precisely what the log-supermodularity of a precludes.
Theorem 1 imposes strong restrictions on the pattern of international specialization. If a country with characteristic 1 specializes in a sector with characteristic 1 , then a country with characteristic 2 < 1 cannot specialize in a sector with characteristic 2 > 1 . In other words, there must be a ladder of countries such that higher-countries produce highergoods.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds in a R-economy. Then high-countries specialize in high-sectors.
So far, we have shown that Assumption 1 is su¢ cient to make predictions on the pattern of international specialization in a R-economy. Conversely, we can show that Assumption 1 cannot be dispensed with if the log-supermodularity of Q is to hold in all R-economies. To see this, consider a two-sector R-economy. In this environment, if a were not log-supermodular, then one could …nd a high-country in which the marginal returns of factors of production would be strictly higher in the low-sector and a low-country in which the marginal returns of factors of production would be strictly higher in the high-sector. Therefore, the high-country would specialize in the low-sector and the low-country in the highsector, which would contradict the log-supermodularity of Q. (2007) notes that " Jones (1961) seems to have done about as well as one can, showing that an e¢ cient assignment of countries to goods will minimize the product of their unit labor requirements." We have just shown that by imposing the log-supermodularity of factor productivity across countries and sectors, one can generate much stronger predictions. The reason is simple. Using our notations and taking logs, Jones (1961) states that an e¢ cient assignment of countries to goods must solve max P ln a ( ; ) .
Corollary 1 merely points out that the solution to this assignment problem exhibits positive assortative matching if ln a ( ; ) is supermodular; see e.g. Becker (1973) , Kremer (1993) ,
and Legros and Newman (2002) .
Though we have restricted ourselves in this section to the case where each country only produces one good, the formal connection between the Ricardian model and assignment models holds more generally. In Dornbusch et al. (1977) , for example, both countries produce a continuum of goods, but the pattern of international specialization still re ‡ects the optimal assignment of goods to countries. Formally, let ( ) f 2 jl(!; ; ) > 0 for some ! 2 g be the set of goods produced in a country with characteristic . Without Assumption 0, this set may not be a singleton. However, using the same logic as in Theorem 1, it is easy to show that if a ( ; ) is strictly log-supermodular, then ( ) must be increasing in the strong set order. Put simply, high-countries must specialize in high-sectors, as previously stated in Corollary 1.
In light of this discussion, it should not be surprising that log-supermodularity has played an important, albeit implicit role in many applications and extensions of the Ricardian model.
In his "Technology Gap" model of international trade, Krugman (1986) assumes, using our notations, that labor productivity in country c and sector s is given by a
where s is an index of good s's technological intensity and c is a measure of country c's closeness to the world technological frontier. Since @ 2 ln a @ @ > 0, this functional form satis…es
Assumption 1, which is the critical su¢ cient condition for Krugman's (1986) results to hold.
Log-supermodularity also is at the heart of the recent literature on institutions and trade; see e.g. Acemoglu, Antras, and Helpman (2007), Costinot (2006) , Cuñat and Melitz (2006) , Levchenko (2007) , Matsuyama (2005) , Nunn (2007), and Vogel (2007) . These papers have shown that cross-country di¤erences in institutions may give rise to a pattern of comparative advantage, even in the absence of true technological di¤erences. Though the aforementioned papers di¤er in terms of the institutional characteristics they focus on-from credit market imperfections to rigidities in the labor market-they share the same fundamental objective:
providing micro-theoretical foundations for the log-supermodularity of factor productivity with respect to countries' "institutional quality" and sectors' "institutional dependence,"
whatever those characteristics may be. The key feature of a F -economy is that the set of factors allocated to a given sector is the same in all countries. Because of free trade and Hicks-neutrality, we have:
Source of
In a F -economy, the assignment function ( s ; c ) does not vary across countries. Hence, patterns of international specialization may only arise from cross-country di¤erences in factor endowments, f (!; c ).
5.2.
Assumptions. To make predictions on the pattern of international specialization in a F -economy, we make two assumptions. First, we assume that:
Assumption 2. f (!; ) is log-supermodular. Assumption 2 states that high-countries are relatively more abundant in high-! factors.
For any pair of countries, c 1 and c 2 , and factors, ! 1 and ! 2 , such that c 1 c 2 , ! 1 ! 2 , and f (! 2 ; c 1 ), f (! 2 ; c 2 ) 6 = 0, Assumption 2 implies
As previously mentioned, this is equivalent to the assumption that the densities of countries'factor endowments, f c (!) f (!; c ), can be ranked in terms of monotone likelihood ratio dominance. Milgrom (1981) o¤ers many examples of density functions satisfying this assumption, including the normal (with mean ) and the uniform (on [0; ]).
In addition, we assume that:
Assumption 3 states that high-! factors are relatively more productive in high-sectors, irrespective of the country where they are located. In our model, Assumptions 2 and 3 play the same role as the ordinal assumptions on factor abundance and factor intensity, respectively, in the two-by-two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin model.
5.3.
Theorem 2. In a F -economy, Assumptions 2 and 3 imply Q ( ; ) log-supermodular.
The proof relies on Lemmas 1 and 2, but the broad logic is intuitive. If h (!; ) satis…es Assumption 3, then high-! factors are assigned to high-sectors under an e¢ cient allocation.
If, in addition, f (!; ) satis…es Assumption 2, then a high value of raises the likelihood of high values of ! relative to low values of !. This increases the likelihood that a given factor is allocated to high-sectors, and in turn, the relative output of these sectors. This, in a nutshell, explains why Q( ; ) is log-supermodular.
Now consider a pair of countries, c 1 and c 2 , producing a pair of goods, s 1 and s 2 , with c 1
Still considering the pair of countries, c 1 and c 2 , and applying Theorem 1 to an arbitrary subset of J goods, we obtain the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. In a F -economy where Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, if two countries produce J goods, with c 1 c 2 and s 1 ::: s J , then the high-country tends to specialize in the high-sectors:
In a F -economy, the assignment function e ( s ) is the the same in all countries. As a result, cross-country di¤erences in factor endowments are mechanically re ‡ected in their patterns however, is that its restrictions are about aggregate endowments of capital and labor, not the full distribution of (K/ L) s . If there only are two sectors, the two sets of restrictions are equivalent; 10 but with more than two sectors, restrictions on the full distribution are stronger, and hence, lead to stronger predictions.
Corollary 2 also shows that imperfect competition and product di¤erentiation, which are common assumptions in the empirical trade literature, are not necessary to derive "smooth" predictions about aggregate output in environments with multiple countries, goods, and factors. 11 In Romalis (2004) , for example, similar predictions are derived in an economy with two factors, two countries, and a continuum of goods because of monopolistic competition 10 In the two-sector case, the supply of the two factors, ! 1 ( K/ L) 1 and ! 2 ( K/ L) 2 , must be given by V ! 1 = K L( K/L) 2 ( K/L) 1 ( K/L) 2 and V ! 2 = K L( K/L) 1 ( K/L) 2 ( K/L) 1 , respectively. Hence there is a one-to-one mapping between K and L, on the one hand, and V ! 1 and V ! 2 , on the other hand. 11 Eaton and Kortum (2002) make a related point in a Ricardian environment, showing that a gravity equation can be derived under perfect competition in a multi-country-multi-sector economy. The mechanism emphasized by our model, however, is very di¤erent. Unlike Eaton and Kortum (2002) , it relies on the e¢ cient assignment of heterogeneous factors across sectors rather than random productivity shocks. and non-factor price equalization. In a F -economy, markets are perfectly competitive and factor price equalization holds. Yet, the log-supermodularity of h in (!; ) creates a strong enough connection between factor and sector characteristics-namely, positive assortative matching-to guarantee that countries should produce relatively more in the sectors that use their abundant factors intensively.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that Assumption 3 only matters indirectly through its impact on e ( s ). In the proof of Theorem 2, once we have established that high-! factors are assigned to high-sectors, restrictions on h (!; ) are irrelevant. Therefore, Assumptions 2 and 3 also imply that aggregate employment,
Corollary 3. In a F -economy where Assumptions 2 and 3 hold, if two countries produce J goods, with c 1 c 2 and s 1 ::: s J , then aggregate employment and aggregate revenues follow the same pattern of specialization as aggregate output:
Corollary 3 is attractive from an empirical standpoint. In order to test such predictions on the pattern of international specialization, one is free to use aggregate data on either output, employment, or revenues. Moreover, our predictions all are ordinal in nature. This means that one does not need to observe the true country and sector characteristics to confront them with the data, any monotonic transformation of and will do.
Minimal Su¢ cient Conditions.
We have just shown that Assumptions 2 and 3 are su¢ cient conditions to predict the pattern of international specialization in a F -economy.
This raises one obvious question: Are there weaker properties on f (!; c ) and h (!; s ) that may also lead to the log-supermodularity of Q( s ; c )? The short answer is, like in Section 4, that Assumptions 2 and 3 cannot be dispensed with if one wants to make predictions in all F -economies. To address that question formally, we follow the strategy of Athey (2002) and say that: satis…ed. It simply means that, without one or the other, the conclusion C may not hold in all environments. In the next Theorem, we show that the log-supermodularity of f (!; c ) and h (!; s ) are a minimal pair of su¢ cient conditions to predict the the log-supermodularity of Q( s ; c ) in all F -economies.
Theorem 3. In a F -economy, Assumptions 2 and 3 are a minimal pair of su¢ cient conditions for Q( s ; c ) to be log-supermodular.
From Theorem 2, we already know that Assumptions 2 and 3 are a pair of su¢ cient conditions. In order to establish that this pair is minimal, we need to prove the existence of Interestingly, the forces that shape the pattern of international specialization in a Feconomy also play a central role in determining the prevalence of organizational forms in trade models with …rm-level heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003) , most notably Helpman et al. (2004) and Antras and Helpman (2004) . The formal relationship between these papers and ours is discussed in details in Costinot (2007) . To map these models into our general framework, one needs to reinterpret each "factor"as a "…rm"with productivity !; each "country"as an "industry"with characteristic ; and each "sector"as an "organization"with characteristic .
Then, total sales Q( ; ) by …rms with a " -organization"in a " -industry"can be expressed Like in Theorem 2, the assignment function e ( ) is the same across industries. As a result, di¤erences in the distribution of …rm productivity are mechanically re ‡ected in the prevalence of various organizational forms. This explains why industries with relatively more productive …rms shall have relatively more sales associated with the organization that more productive …rms select, whether it is FDI or vertical integration. 14 13 The previous models and ours only di¤er in terms of market structure. In the previous models, monopolistic competition implies r(!; ) 6 = p ( ) q(!; ; ). In Costinot (2007) , we show that our analysis carries over to that environment if r(!; ) satis…es a single crossing property. In a F -economy, the only role of Assumption 3 is to guarantee that p ( ) q(!; ; ) satis…es a single crossing property for all p ( ). 14 Antras and Helpman (2004) also recognize the existence of a connection between the mechanism at work in their model and Meltiz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004) ; see footnote 10 p. 571. However, they do not discuss the critical assumptions on which this logic depends. Our analysis shows, for example, that assuming the log-supermodularity of f (!; ) is critical, whereas assuming Pareto distributions is not.
6. Multiple Sources of Comparative Advantage 6.1. A simple generalization with factor-augmenting technological di¤erences.
Before o¤ering a general analysis of economies with factor endowment and Ricardian technological di¤erences, we present a simple generalization of a F -economy that allows for factor-augmenting technological di¤erences. Formally, we assume that q satis…es
where ! + t ( ) 2 for all ! 2 and 2 . For example, one can think of ! as the log of workers'number of years of education and of t( ) as a measure of the quality of the educational system in a given country. If t ( ) 0, then we are back to the Hicks-neutral case.
But if t ( ) 6 = 0, Equation (8) 
; c ] and e ( s ) is given by Equation (7). Therefore, if we can show that e f (!; c ) is log-supermodular, then we can still use Theorem 2 to predict the pattern of international specialization. The next theorem o¤ers su¢ cient conditions on f and t that allow us to do so.
Theorem 4. Consider a F a -economy where Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. If t is increasing in and f is strictly positive and log-concave in !, then Q ( ; ) is log-supermodular.
Like log-supermodularity, log-concavity is satis…ed by many standard distributions including the uniform, normal, and extreme value distributions; see Bergstrom and Bagnoli (2005) .
The monotonicity of t and the log-concavity of f guarantee that technological di¤erences reinforce the pattern of international specialization driven by factor endowment di¤erences, Assumptions 2 and 3. Even in the absence of true cross-country di¤erences in factor supplies, they imply that high-countries are relatively more abundant, now in e¢ ciency units, in the high-! factors. 15 The pattern of international specialization in a F a -economy follows.
Finally, note that the previous results are stronger than standard Heckscher-Ohlin predictions with factor-augmenting productivity di¤erences; see e.g. Tre ‡er (1993) . Like in a F -economy, our approach leads to predictions on the cross-sectional variation of aggregate output rather than the factor content of trade.
6.2. General technological di¤erences. We have just shown that the predictions of Sections 4 and 5 may extend to an environment with both Ricardian and factor-endowment sources of comparative advantage, albeit under strong functional form restrictions. We now turn to the case in which q satis…es:
Assumption 4. q (!; ; ) is log-supermodular.
Assumption 4 is a strict generalization of the assumptions used in R-and F -economies. 16 Compared to a R-economy, it allows complementarities between ! and ; and compared to a F -economy, it allows complementarities between and . Hence, both factor endowment and technological di¤erences can, in principle, determine the pattern of international specialization. The question we want to ask is: Does Assumption 4 put enough structure on the nature of technological di¤erences to predict the pattern of international specialization across all countries and sectors of an elementary neoclassical economy? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Under Assumption 4, robust predictions about international specialization can only be derived in the two most extreme sectors, as we now demonstrate. 15 It is worth emphasizing that Theorem 4 crucially relies on the linear relationship between ! and t ( ).
We could, in principle, generalize the nature of factor-augmenting technological di¤erences by assuming that
This generalized version of a F a -economy would still be equivalent to a F -economy up to a change of variable, but predicting the log-supermodularity of Q would then require strong regularity conditions on f , as strong as the restrictions on t are weak . 16 Strictly speaking, Assumption 4 is not a generalization of the assumptions used in a F a -economy.
According to Equation (8), if h is log-supermodular and t is increasing, then q is log-supermodular in (!; ) and ( ; ), but not necessariliy log-supermodular in (!; ). However, as mentioned in Section 6.1, there exists a change of variable e ! ! + t ( ) such that a F a -economy reduces to a F -economy. 6.2.1. A counter-example. We start by o¤ering a counter-example in which factor supply satis…es Assumption 2, factor productivity satis…es Assumption 4, and yet aggregate output is not log-supermodular.
Consider an elementary neoclassical economy comprising two countries with characteristics 2 > 1 > 0; S > 2 sectors with characteristics S S 1 ; S 2 > ::: > 1 ( 1 1 ; 1 2 ) > 0; and a continuum of factors ! 2 [0; 1]. Factor productivity and factor supply are given by q (!; ; ) ! 1 2 ; (10) f (!; ) 1.
By Equations (10) and (11), Assumptions 4 and 2 are trivially satis…ed. For any c = 1; 2 and s = 1; :::; S 1, we denote ! c;s the factor whose marginal return is equalized between sector s and sector s + 1 in country c. By Equation (10), we have
where s s+1 2 s 2 s+1 1 s 1 . For any 2 > 1 > 0 and S > ::: > 1 > 0, there exist p S > ::: > p ( 1 ) > 0 such that 1 > ! c;S > ::: > ! c;1 > 0 for c = 1; 2. Assuming that the previous series of inequalities holds, we can write ( s ; c ) = ! c;s 1 ; ! c;s , with the convention that ! c; 1 = 0 and ! c;S+1 = 1. Now combining this observation with Equations . Now take 1 < s 1 < s 2 < S such that s 1 = s 1 1 = s 2 = s 2 1 = 1. Equations (12) and (13) imply
1 . 17 What went wrong? The problem comes from the restrictions (or lack thereof) that Assumption 4 imposes on the variations of the assignment function, ( ; ). In a R-economy, Equation (5) guarantees that ( ; ) is either or ;. In a F -economy, Equation (6) guarantees that ( ; ) is invariant across countries. Here, Equation (10) merely requires that:
(i) 1 > ! c;S > ::: > ! c;1 > 0 for c = 1; 2, by the log-supermodularity of q in (!; ); and that: 17 The conditions S > ::: > 1 > 0, s1 = s1 1 = s2 = s2 1 = 1, and s2 2 s1 2 < s2 1 s1 1 all are satis…ed, for example, if S = 6, s 1 = 2, s 2 = 5, 1 1 ; :::; 6 1 = (1; 2; 3; 5; 6; 7), and 1 2 ; :::; 6 2 = (1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6). . At a formal level, our complementarity approach breaks down because it requires too strong conditions. In order to predict patterns of specialization using Lemmas 1 and 2, we now need 1I ( ; ) (!) to be log-supermodular. Assuming that q is log-supermodular in ( ; ) and (!; ) guarantees that 1I ( ; ) (!) is log-supermodular in ( ; ) and (!; ), as in R-and F -economies, respectively. Both results are the counterparts of predictions about the monotonicity of solutions of assignment problems in the monotone comparative statics literature; see e.g. Topkis (1998) . Unfortunately, there is no underlying assignment problem such that the log-supermodularity of q in (!; ) implies the log-supermodularity of 1I ( ; ) (!) in (!; ). On the contrary, if q is log-supermodular in ( ; ) and (!; ), then 1I ( ; ) (!) must be log-submodular in (!; ). This is what we refer to as the "indirect e¤ect of Ricardian technological di¤erences on factor assignment."
As a careful reader may have already noticed, our counter-example is based purely on technological considerations. Although the fact that factor endowment di¤erences can be a source of comparative advantage is crucial, our argument does not rely on factor endowment di¤erences per se: f (!; 1 ) = f (!; 2 ) = 1. Instead, it relies on the fact that for factor endowments to be a source of comparative advantage, sectors must vary in their factor intensity, i.e. q must be log-supermodular in (!; ). In our counter-example, the log-supermodularity of q in both ( ; ) and (!; ) is the only issue. The previous counter-example shows, unfortunately, that these strong results do not hold generally. This is an important observation which highlights the potential caveats of combining insights from distinct models without a generalizing framework. In a R-economy, if high-countries are relatively more productive in high-sectors, then they produce relatively more in these sectors. In a F -economy, if high-countries are relatively more abundant in high-! factors and high-! factors are relatively more productive in high-sectors, then the same pattern of international specialization arises. In our counter-example, these assumptions on technology and factor endowments all are satis…ed, yet high-countries do not produce relatively more in all high-sectors. 18 Our last theorem o¤ers weaker, but robust predictions on the cross-sectional variation of aggregate output in this general environment. According to Theorem 5, if both factor endowment and technological di¤erences are sources of comparative advantage, the pattern of international specialization is unambiguous only in the two most extreme sectors. The formal argument combines the main ideas of Theorems 1 and 2. Holding the assignment function ( ; ) constant across countries, the log-supermodularity of f and q implies that high-countries produce relatively more in the high-sectors, as in a F -economy. Since q is log-supermodular in and , the cross-country variation in ( ; ) then reinforces this e¤ect in the two most extreme sectors. As in a R-economy, a given factor ! is more likely to be found in high-sectors in high-countries.
This implies that a given sector is more likely to be assigned low-! factors in high-countries, and in turn, that ( ; c 2 ) ( ; c 1 ) and ( ; c 1 ) ( ; c 2 ). In other words, Ricardian technological di¤erences necessarily lead to more factors in the highest-sector in high-countries and more factors in the lowest-sector in low-countries, thereby strengthening the pattern of international specialization driven by factor endowment di¤erences. 18 In addition, the previous counter-example shows that assuming q (!; ; ) h (!; ) a ( ; ) with h and a log-supermodular is not su¢ cient either to derive the log-supermodularity of Q.
Our …nal result is reminiscent of the Rybczynski results derived by Jones and Scheinkman (1977) in a standard neoclassical model with an arbitrary number of goods and factors.
They show, among other things, that if factor prices are constant across countries, as in our model, then an increase in the endowment of one factor must decrease output in one sector and increase output more than proportionally in another sector. An important di¤erence between this result and ours is that Theorem 5 clearly identi…es the two most extreme sectors as those being a¤ected by changes in factor endowments. 19
Concluding Remarks
The present paper has developed an elementary theory of comparative advantage. Our theory emphasizes an intimate relationship between log-supermodularity and comparative advantage, whether driven by technology or factor endowment. If factor productivity and/or factor supply are log-supermodular, then many sharp predictions on the pattern of international specialization can be derived in economies with an arbitrarily large number of countries, goods, and factors.
While we have focused on the determinants of international specialization, we believe that our general results could also be useful outside international trade. The basic structure of our model-Equations (3) and (4)is central to many models with agent heterogeneity. These models may focus on di¤erent aggregate variables and di¤erent market structures. But at the core, there are "agents"with characteristics !; these agents belong to "populations"with density f (!; ); and they sort into "occupations"with characteristics based on their returns r (!; ; predictions on the pattern of international specialization in economies with Ricardian di¤erences and multiple factors of productions. These predictions, however, are based on assumptions on factor prices, rather than primitive assumptions on factor supply. layers of a hierarchy. 20 In any of these circumstances, our analysis demonstrates that logsupermodularity potentially has important implications for the cross-sectional variation of aggregate variables across populations and occupations.
20 See e.g. Epple and Romer (1991) , Champonnois (2006) , Banerjee and Newman (1993) , Grogger and Hanson (2008) , and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) , respectively.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. We proceed by contradiction. Consider 0 and 0 . Suppose
. This implies Q ( 0 ; ) > 0 and Q ( ; 0 ) > 0 with 6 = 0 and 6 = 0 . Since Q ( 0 ; ) > 0, Equations (3) and (4) further imply the existence of ! 2 such that r (!; 0 ; ) > r (!; ; ). Using Equation (5), we can simplify the previous inequality into p( 0 )a ( 0 ; ) > p( )a ( ; ). Since Q ( ; 0 ) > 0, a similar reasoning implies p ( ) a ( ; 0 ) > p ( 0 ) a ( 0 ; 0 ). Combining the previous inequalities, we obtain a ( 0 ; ) a ( ; 0 ) > a ( ; ) a ( 0 ; 0 ), which contradicts Assumption 1. QED.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let e h(!; ) 1I e ( ) (!) h(!; ). We …rst show that e h(!; ) is logsupermodular. We proceed by contradiction. Consider ! ! 0 and 0 . Suppose that e h (!; 0 ) e h (! 0 ; ) > e h (!; ) e h (! 0 ; 0 ). This implies ! 2 e ( 0 ) and ! 0 2 e ( ) with ! 6 = ! 0 and 6 = 0 . Using Equation (7), we then get
which contradicts Assumption 3. By Equations (3), (6), and (7), we have Q( ; ) = R e h(!; )a ( ) f (!; )d!. We have just shown that that e h(!; ) is log-supermodular. a ( ) is trivially log-supermodular. By Assumption 2, we know that f (!; ) is log-supermodular.
Theorem 2 derives from these 3 observations and the fact that log-supermodularity is preserved by multiplication and integration, by Lemmas 1 and 2. QED.
Proof of Theorem 3. Theorem 2 shows that Assumptions 2 and 3 are su¢ cient conditions. That they are a minimal pair is proved by 2 Lemmas. Inequality (14) implies ! 6 = ! 0 . Now consider a F -economy with 2 factors, ! and ! 0 , 2 countries, with characteristics and 0 , and 2 sectors, with characteristics > 0 , such that a ( ) = a ( 0 ) = 1,
h (!; ) = h (! 0 ; 0 ) = 1,
h (!; 0 ) = h (! 0 ; ) = 0,
which is possible since ! 6 = ! 0 and 6 = 0 . Combining Equations (15), (16), and (17) with Equations (3), (6), and (7) and Inequality (14), we get Q( ; 0 )Q( 0 ; ) > Q( ; )Q( 0 ; 0 ). (16) and (17), Assumption 3 is satis…ed. A contradiction. QED. 
By Equations
which is possible since ! 6 = ! 0 and 6 = 0 . Inequality (19) implies p( 0 )h (!; 0 ) > p( )h (!; ) and p( )h (! 0 ; ) > p( 0 )h (! 0 ; 0 ). Combining these two inequalities with Equations (3), (6), (7), (20), (21), and (22), we get Q( ; 0 )Q( 0 ; ) > Q( ; )Q( 0 ; 0 ). By Equations (21) and (22), Assumption 2 is satis…ed. A contradiction. QED.
Proof of Theorem 4. We …rst show that if f (!; ) is log-supermodular, strictly positive, and log-concave in !, and t is increasing in , then e f (!; ) f [! t( ); ] is log-supermodular.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist ! ! 0 and 0 such that
Since f is log-supermodular in (!; ), we know that
Combining Inequalities (23) and (24) and the fact that f > 0, we get
Since t is increasing in , Inequality (25) implies that f ( ; ) cannot be of Polya Frequency of order 2, which contradicts f log-concave in !; see . At this point, we know that aggregate output is given by Equations (7) and (9), that e f (!; ) is log-supermodular, and that h(!; ) is log-supermodular by Assumption 2. Thus, we can invoke Theorem 2, which implies Q( ; ) log-supermodular. QED.
Proof of Theorem 5. We use the following Lemma.
Lemma 5. If q (!; ; ) satis…es Assumption 4, then ( ; c 2 ) ( ; c 1 ) and ( ; c 1 ) ( ; c 2 ) for any c 2 c 1 .
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that = 1 . We only show that Assumption 4 implies ( ; c 2 ) ( ; c 1 ) for any c 2 c 1 . The argument for ( ; c 1 ) ( ; c 2 )
is similar. We proceed by contradiction. Take ! 2 ( ; c 2 ). By Equation (4), we have p ( ) q(!; ; c 2 ) > max s6 =1 p ( s ) q(!; s ; c 2 ). Now suppose that ! = 2 ( ; c 1 ). By Equation (4), we also have max s6 =1 p ( s ) q(!; s ; c 1 ) > p ( ) q(!; ; c 1 ). Let s arg max s6 =1 p ( s ) q(!; s ; c 1 ). Combining the two previous inequalities, we get q(!; ; c 2 )q(!; s ; c 1 ) > q(!; s ; c 2 )q(!; ; c 1 ). Since s and c 2 c 1 , this contradicts Assumption 4.
QED.
Proof of Theorem 5 continued. Fix c 1 2 and de…ne e Q ( ; ) such that (26) e Q ( ; ) R ( ; c 1 ) q(!; ; )f (!; )d (!) , for all 2 and 2 . We can use the same reasoning as in Theorem 2 to show that e Q ( ; ) is log-supermodular. By Assumption 4, 1I ( ; c 1 ) (!) is log-supermodular in (!; ).
By Assumptions 2 and 4, q(!; ; ) and f (!; ) also are log-supermodular. Hence, e Q ( ; )
is log-supermodular by Lemmas 1 and 2, which implies (27) e Q ( ; c 1 ) e Q ( ; c 2 ) e Q ( ; c 2 ) e Q ( ; c 1 ) , for any c 2 c 1 . By Equation (26), we have e Q ( ; c 1 ) = Q ( ; c 1 ) and e Q ( ; c 1 ) = Q ( ; c 1 ). Since q(!; ; ) 0 and f (!; ) 0, we also have e Q ( ; c 2 ) Q ( ; c 2 ) and Q ( ; c 2 ) e Q ( ; c 2 ) by Lemma 5. Combining the previous conditions with Inequality (27), we get Q ( ; c 1 ) Q ( ; c 2 ) Q ( ; c 2 ) Q ( ; c 1 ) for any c 2 c 1 . QED.
